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Abstract Android devices are shipped in several flavors by more than 100
manufacturer partners, which extend the Android “vanilla” OS with new sys-
tem services, and modify the existing ones. These proprietary extensions ex-
pose Android devices to reliability and security issues. In this paper, we pro-
pose a coverage-guided fuzzing platform (Chizpurfle) based on evolutionary
algorithms to test proprietary Android system services. A key feature of this
platform is the ability to profile coverage on the actual, unmodified Android
device, by taking advantage of dynamic binary re-writing techniques. We ap-
plied this solution on three high-end commercial Android smartphones. The
results confirmed that evolutionary fuzzing is able to test Android OS sys-
tem services more efficiently than blind fuzzing. Furthermore, we evaluate the
impact of different choices for the fitness function and selection algorithm.
Keywords fuzz testing · evolutionary algorithms · Android OS
1 Introduction
Android is the most common operating system for mobile devices, such as
smartphones and tablets (Statista, 2018). Android is shipped in several fla-
vors implemented by a large number of vendors, e.g., Samsung, Huawei, LG,
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Motorola, and more than 100 other companies (Android, 2018). These ven-
dors extend the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) (Android Open-Source
Project, 2016) with new and customized software services, in order to dif-
ferentiate from the competition. However, these customizations also lead to
reliability and security risks for the users, since they are not as well tested
as the open-source version of Android and introduce additional attack vectors
(Xu et al, 2016).
In this paper, we present an approach based on fuzzing and on evolution-
ary algorithms to test proprietary Android system services. On the one hand,
fuzzing is a well-established and effective robustness and security testing tech-
nique, that identifies weaknesses in fragile software interfaces by injecting in-
valid and unexpected inputs (Miller et al, 1990). Fuzzing was initially conceived
as a black-box technique; subsequent studies showed that its effectiveness can
significantly benefit from information about the test coverage, by steering the
generation of test inputs towards uncovered paths (Böhme et al, 2016; Michal
Zalewski, 2016; Bounimova et al, 2013; Google Inc., 2017). On the other hand,
evolutionary algorithms are a popular approach to address search-based soft-
ware engineering problems (Whitley, 2001; Harman et al, 2012), and represent
a promising solution for coverage-guided fuzzing: they can leverage coverage
information to generate new inputs by evolving the most promising current
ones, such as recent inputs that discovered new code paths. Since the effective-
ness of tests is statistically correlated to code coverage (Kochhar et al, 2015),
the measurable goal of evolutionary testing is to reach the highest coverage
possible.
Applying this fuzz testing strategy on Android customizations is techni-
cally challenging, because it requires test coverage information from propri-
etary code. Instrumenting at compile-time the Android OS is inconvenient for
Android vendors (due to the complexity of the Android build process), and
impossible for independent testers (as they do not have access to the source
code). Furthermore, it is also not possible to get coverage information by
running the customized Android OS in an emulated environment, since cus-
tomizations can often only run on the real hardware. (Yaghmour, 2013) The
lack of source code also introduces other technical challenges for test input
generation, including the unfeasibility of accurately measuring the code size
of the Android service under test (as several services run in the context of the
same OS process, without a clear separation of the code of individual services),
the “saturation” of the coverage of specific methods of the service under test
(since, for the previous reason, coverage cannot be measured in relative terms
with respect to the total code size), and the identification of the input surface
of the service.
We overcome these limitations by proposing the Chizpurfle platform for
evolutionary fuzzing of Android OS services. The contributions of this paper
are the following.
A new fuzzing approach for the Android OS based on genetic al-
gorithms. We apply evolutionary computing to fuzz testing, by proposing
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a genetic algorithm tailored for fuzzing Android OS services. Genetic algo-
rithms are a special class of evolutionary algorithms, where the tentative so-
lutions (which, in our context, are represented by a set of input parameters
to invoke a method of an Android OS service) are evolved by recombination
and mutation (Back, 1996). However, simply applying genetic algorithms to
generate test inputs can be inefficient, since there is a risk of wasting testing
time on service methods that are already well-covered (but the saturation of
the relative coverage cannot be accurately measured, due to the lack of source
code). Therefore, we introduce the idea of community for co-evolving test
inputs across the several, heterogeneous methods of a service under test. This
approach varies the relative size of input populations within the community,
and awards the most promising populations in order to carefully focus the test
time budget on specific methods.
A reusable, extensible platform, Chizpurfle, that implements the
proposed fuzzing approach. The Chizpurfle platform aims to be a basis for
research on evolutionary fuzzing in the context of mobile devices. It overcomes
the technical issues for applying fuzz testing strategies, including dynamic bi-
nary rewriting techniques to collect coverage information from real commercial
devices and to perform coverage-guided tests on proprietary customizations.
Moreover, the design of the Chizpurfle platform provides representations for
the elements of genetic algorithms (individual, fitness, community, popula-
tion, ...), in order to be extensible and to enable experimentation (e.g., with
new heuristics, new mutation operators, ...) to further enhance evolutionary
fuzzing. We release Chizpurfle as open-source software1, to allow users to ex-
periment with their own algorithms. Since the design space of evolutionary
algorithms is wide (Whitley, 2001; Harman et al, 2012), we believe that such
a platform can be a valuable asset for supporting future research.
An experimental evaluation of evolutionary fuzzing on several com-
mercial Android devices, under different configurations of genetic
algorithms. This paper presents an experimental study on three high-end
commercial Android smartphones. We applied evolutionary fuzzing in 420
fuzzing campaigns over 15 different proprietary services (5 for each device), for
a total of more than 8 000 000 tests, performed on the actual devices, which
lasted more than 60 days (CPU time). Overall, evolutionary fuzzing is able
to test Android services more thoroughly than black-box fuzzing: while some
services may not benefit from evolutionary fuzzing (for example, services with
a simpler input surface, or services that are influenced by the hardware state),
for other services the improvement can be very high (the coverage doubles
in several cases, and it is even higher than 24x in one specific case). More-
over, we expect that the effectiveness of evolutionary fuzzing can be further
improved by introducing new mutation operators and new heuristics. We also
compared several configurations of evolutionary fuzzing, by considering differ-
ent fitness functions (which evaluate the quality of test inputs) and selection
1 The source code and documentation of the Chizpurfle platform is available at https:
//github.com/dessertlab/fantastic_beasts
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algorithms (which choose the inputs to evolve). The experimental results show
that some of the considered fitness functions perform better than others in spo-
radic cases, but they are equally effective from a statistical point of view; and
that the non-parametric selection algorithms exhibit statistically-significant
better performance than the parametric one.
Compared to our earlier work (Iannillo et al, 2017), which adopted a simpler
evolutionary approach, and which separately tested the methods of Android
OS services, this paper presents a new approach based on genetic algorithms,
on the co-evolution of test inputs through the idea of community, and on a
new extensible architecture of the Chizpurfle platform. Moreover, this paper
presents more extensive experimentation on several Android devices, and in-
vestigates the impact of different configurations of the genetic algorithm.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we describe in
more detail the problem of testing Android system services, and the research
questions addressed in this paper; Section 3 presents the Chizpurfle platform;
Section 4 shows the experiments on commercial Android devices; Sections 5
and 6 discuss the threats to validity and related work; Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Problem statement and research questions
The Android OS is a software stack based on a service-oriented architecture.
Mobile apps consume services through the rich, high-level Android framework
APIs. In turn, the classes of the Android framework invoke the system services
of the Android OS, which run in separate, privileged processes of the Android
OS, and which perform the actual work (e.g., accessing hardware resources,
managing the app lifecycle, interacting with other apps and the user, etc.).
These system services provide a public interface represented by service meth-
ods, which include a set of method parameters in input and output. This public
interface is invoked by the Android framework through remote procedure calls
(RPC) using the Android Binder API, in a similar way to distributed mid-
dleware. Examples of system services from the vanilla Android OS are: the
Activity Manager, which exposes services for managing the lifecycle of apps;
the Connectivity Manager, which abstracts the networking capabilities of the
device; and the Package Manager, which exposes services for handling and
checking the permissions of apps.
Android vendors modify these system services to provide support for the
specific hardware of their products. For example, the Camera Service and the
Radio Interface Layer of the vanilla Android OS are customized by linking
them to custom drivers for the camera and the baseband processor. Moreover,
Android vendors can add system services from scratch in order to provide
new features. For example, the CocktailBarService from Samsung Galaxy
S6 Edge provides APIs for handling a new type of GUI notifications, with 41
public methods (Fig. 1).
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Community of CocktailBarService
Population of 
bindRemoteViewsService(java.lang.String, int, android.content.Intent, android.os.IBinder)
“”, 0, null, null “”, 23, null, null “”, -1, 0xaa324514, null
Population of notifyCocktailViewDataChanged(java.lang.String, int, int)
“”, 0, 0 “j'msL?”, 1402, -90“asdf”, 13, 52 “’^?F-”, -12, 999
Population of partiallyUpdateCocktail(java.lang.String, android.widget.RemoteViews, int)
“”, null, 0 “”, null, 23 “”, 0x343b5802, -100 “?@fdS-”,0xaa324514, -1
Fig. 1 Individuals, populations, and community for the CocktailBarService of the Sam-
sung Galaxy S6 Edge.
In order to generate effective tests for these system services, we adopt
fuzzing and evolutionary algorithms. Our fuzzing approach generates method
calls with inputs that match the signature of the target method, thus, the in-
puts can be considered “valid” from the syntactic point of view (i.e., the type
system of the Android service interface). However, these inputs can be “in-
valid” from the point of view of the target Android service, depending on the
specific meaning of the parameters and of the method call. For example, a very
large value submitted through an integer input parameter may represent an
out-of-norm value for the service, or a “null” object reference may violate the
assumption that a given input object reference should always be a valid one.
Testing against such “invalid” inputs is the intended goal of fuzzing, which aims
to abuse the service interface to find inputs that are not gracefully handled.
The fuzzing approach generates invalid inputs by using mutation operators
that introduce boundary integer values, unusual characters, null references,
and combinations of thereof (e.g., by using cross-over on the inputs of two
method calls). It is important to identify these invalid inputs since they pose a
reliability/security threat, as they can originate from any buggy or malicious
application. Random fuzzing may be inefficient at exploring the space of ser-
vice API inputs, which is typically very large; therefore, evolutionary fuzzing
tunes the generation of new inputs according to the test coverage achieved by
previous inputs.
In the context of evolutionary fuzzing, an individual (i.e., a candidate
solution) is represented by a vector of input values for one of the methods of
the service under test. A population (i.e., a group of individuals at a given
round of an evolutionary algorithm) includes a set of several input vectors. A
fitness function assigns a numerical value (i.e., the fitness) to an individual,
which in our context represents the potential of the individual to generate good
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new individuals (through mutation or cross-over) that are able to reach not-
yet-executed code. Evolutionary fuzzing evolves the population over several
iterations through the following steps:
1. a selection algorithm to select which individuals from the previous pop-
ulation to evolve;
2. a cross-over phase, that slices and recombines two individuals from the
previous population to generate a new one;
3. a mutation phase, which modifies an element of an individual to generate
a new version of that individual.
In the cross-over phase, we need to avoid combining two input vectors
that refer to different methods, since the resulting vector may not comply
with the number and type of parameters of the method signature. Therefore,
we introduce the notion of community. We restrict a population to include
individuals for the same method of the service under test, and we include
several populations in a community, which is iteratively evolved as a whole.
In the previous example of the CocktailBarService from Samsung Galaxy
S6 Edge (Fig. 1), the community consists of 41 different populations, one for
each method. In a population, every individual represents an input vector for
the method. For example, the method notifyCocktailViewDataChanged has
three parameters, i.e., <java.lang.String, int, int>, a potential individ-
uals in its population are <"asdf", 13,52>, <"j’msL?", 1402,-90>, and so
on.
This organization enables the co-evolution of individuals across the ser-
vice, by varying the relative size of populations within the community, and by
awarding the most promising populations. This approach can make better use
of the test budget and explore the target service more efficiently. For example,
if a service has a method that can only reach a small part of the target service
(e.g., a get/set method that only reads/writes a variable inside the service),
the community will eventually reward individuals for the other methods, thus
steering the testing budget on the methods that have a higher potential to
cover more code of the target service.
The problem of co-evolving individuals becomes even more important in
the context of Android OS services. The first reason is that it is unfeasible to
detect the saturation of the tests for a method by just looking at the relative
coverage of the tests, due to the lack of source code (this technical issue is fur-
ther discussed in Section 4). The second reason is that, compared to previous
evolutionary testing studies (which are mostly applied for unit testing), the
Android services are complex subsystems, with several tens of methods that
share a significant part of the code of the service (Yaghmour, 2013; Levin, 2015;
AndroidXRef, 2019). For example, a service for SMSs can provide methods to
send messages with different flavors (e.g., SMSs with simple text, multipart
text, premium SMSs, etc.), which likely reuse common routines to handle
low-level SMS communication. Moreover, services typically expose methods to
get/set internal parameters, to register event listeners, etc. that tend to use
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shared data. Therefore, the tests for different methods will overlap at cover-
ing the shared code, and it becomes useful to co-evolve the inputs of different
methods in order to drive exploration towards the non-shared code.
It is also important to consider that testing proprietary Android services
must address a number of technical challenges that are different from other
areas of software testing. One of the issues is to identify the set of customized
services in the Android device, and what is the input interface of the Android
services under test (i.e., the methods of the services and their parameters),
which is a basic requirement for performing any kind of testing activity. Then,
before testing, we need to point out the services that were customized by
the vendor of the Android device with respect to the open-source Android
(AOSP). Another key issue is tracking the coverage of the tests even if the
source code is not available, which we address by means of dynamic binary
instrumentation. In this work, we provide a reusable platform that overcomes
these technical issues, and that can serve the research community at focusing
on better fuzz test generation strategies.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss more in detail how these concepts are
implemented in our Chizpurfle platform. Moreover, in the experimental part of
the work, we consider the following research questions on evolutionary fuzzing.
RQ1: Can evolutionary fuzzing improve the test coverage of Android OS
system services, compared to black-box fuzzing?
First, we want to determine whether fuzzing with genetic algorithms can
repay the additional complexity and computational overhead, compared to
the simpler, black-box fuzzing approach (i.e., mutating input values without
exploiting any coverage information). We cannot take for granted that this ap-
proach performs better than its black-box counterpart, since the performance
of evolutionary algorithms is sensitive to the difficulty of the problem at hand
(Naudts and Kallel, 2000; Mitchell et al, 1992). Therefore, the performance
evaluation will compare evolutionary and black-box fuzzing with respect to
test coverage, which is a key performance indicator for fuzzing techniques
(Klees et al, 2018). In order to assess the statistical significance of the dif-
ferences, we base the comparison on hypothesis testing (Arcuri and Briand,
2014). If evolutionary fuzzing can consistently deliver a better test coverage
than black-box fuzzing, then it should be preferred since it will bring a higher
potential to find more bugs and to increase the overall reliability of the An-
droid device. Moreover, the evaluation will also analyze any unique bug found
by evolutionary fuzzing.
We must consider that the tuning of parameters has a great influence on the
performance of genetic algorithms (Grefenstette, 1986; Whitley, 2001; Arcuri
and Briand, 2014; Fraser and Arcuri, 2015). In particular, when designing a
genetic algorithm, a tester should consider two critical aspects at first, that is,
the fitness function for evaluating the quality of the current solution, and the
selection algorithm to selects inputs that should be prioritized for generating
new ones.
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Fig. 2 Overview of Chizpurfle components.
RQ2: What is the impact of the fitness function and of the selection
algorithm on evolutionary fuzzing of Android OS system services?
In the context of fuzz testing, several design choices are possible for the
fitness function and the selection algorithm (Whitley, 2001; Böhme et al, 2016;
Michal Zalewski, 2016; Back, 1996; Bäck and Hoffmeister, 1991; Goldberg and
Deb, 1991). In the paper, we evaluate different configurations and investigate
their impact on the code coverage achieved by evolutionary fuzzing.
3 Evolutionary fuzzing approach
We present the basic components of Chizpurfle in §3.1, the extended architec-
ture of the Chizpurfle platform in §3.2, and the evolutionary fuzzing algorithm
in §3.3.
3.1 The basic Chizpurfle components
Chizpurfle includes six software modules that run on the target Android de-
vice, that cooperate to generate fuzz inputs, to execute tests, and to profile
the target system service; and an external orchestrator on the user worksta-
tion (Fig. 2). These modules were developed in the preliminary tool that we
presented in previous work (Iannillo et al, 2017), and are the basis for the
evolutionary fuzzing platform presented in this work.
TheOrchestrator controls the other modules through the Android Debug
Bridge (ADB) (Android Studio, 2017), and prevents the early termination of
fuzz testing in the case of crashes of system processes.
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The Method Extractor generates a list of services from the target An-
droid device with vendor customizations, and it compares them with the AOSP
of the same version. The Method Extractor queries the Service Manager of
the Android OS to get the list of all registered services, including customized
ones. By iterating on these names, it retrieves the list of service descriptors.
In the case of Java-implemented services (supported by the current version of
the tool), a service descriptor is the string name of the Java Interface that is
implemented by that system service (e.g., the Package Manager service im-
plements the android.content.pm.IPackageManager Java Interface). Then, we
use the Java Reflection API to inspect the definition of the interfaces, and to
get the signatures of the methods in the service. Since the Java Reflection API
is also used for managing communication in Binder, it can reliably get the list
of invokable methods of the service. The methods that cannot be found in the
AOSP, or that have a different signature than their AOSP counterpart, are
marked as “vendor customizations” and considered for testing. Furthermore, it
identifies the system process that hosts the target service: it forces the system
services to be re-published again by restarting the system processes, and in-
tercepts registration calls from the services to the Service Manager using the
ptrace system call of the Linux kernel, in a similar way to debugging tools, in
order to identify in which process the services are running.
The Instrumentation Module profiles the coverage of the system service
under test. We designed this component to run on the actual, unmodified An-
droid device, and to avoid to interfere with the original behavior of the service.
The component is attached to the Android OS process where the proprietary
service is running, without neither restarting the process (as most of these
services are already running since the boot of the device) nor recompiling the
source code of the service.
The Instrumentation Module uses the ptrace system call of the Linux ker-
nel, which allows to write on the memory address space and CPU registers of
a process. We leverage ptrace to perform dynamic binary rewriting of program
code (Nethercote and Seward, 2007; Luk et al, 2005; Ole André V. Ravnås,
2017), in a similar way to virtual machine interpreters. The program is divided
in basic blocks, which are small groups of sequential machine instructions that
end with a branch. This branch instruction is replaced with a branch to the In-
strumentation Module: when the branch is reached, the control flow is returned
to our module, which retrieves the next basic block, applies some transforma-
tions (such as just-in-time compilation and instrumenting the final branch
instruction) and moves the control flow to the block. Moreover, this process is
accelerated by caching basic blocks that have been already processed, so that
the exit branch can directly jump to the next basic block if it is cached. In
our context, we apply this technique to keep track of which basic blocks are
executed, in order to compute the test coverage.
The Output Analyzer gathers coverage data from the Instrumentation
Module through a socket connection, analyzes and saves the data, and feeds
back information to the Input Manager, is in charge of ranking test inputs.
In turn, the Fuzz Input Generator generates new inputs to use for fuzz
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Fig. 3 Architecture of the Chizpurfle platform.
tests. The Test Executor converts the test inputs into actual calls to the
service under test, which is invoked through the Binder RPC interface of the
service.
It is important to note that the input surface tested by this solution is
invokable by any process and application of the Android system. This fact
has security implications, as a malicious app could leverage a bug to crash the
Android services or, even worse, the bug can be the basis for gaining privileges
and for obtaining confidential data (cfr.§ 4.2). Since malicious apps are a real,
critical security threat for mobile devices, it becomes important to perform
testing with invalid inputs to Android services as in this work. Even if we do
not consider security concerns, testing with invalid inputs is still important
to prevent accidental failures that could occur in practice. Android services
are the basis for a variety of mobile apps, including not only stock apps from
the vendor, but also apps of uncertain quality from third-party developers.
Since the interface of Android services is exposed to many service consumers
not known in advance, there are many opportunities for bad data values to
be circulated within the system, thus increasing the importance of gracefully
handling such exceptional inputs.
3.2 Extended architecture of the Chizpurfle platform
The Chizpurfle platform has been extended in this work to support the inclu-
sion of different evolutionary algorithms for test generation. Fig. 3 shows the
architecture of the platform. The grayed-out interfaces enable the implemen-
tation of new fitness functions and selection algorithms that can be plugged in
the Chizpurfle platform. The Chizpurfle platform includes explicit represen-
tations for individuals, populations, and communities. The Input Generator,
that in the previous version only supported random and mutation operators,
has been extended to also support the crossover operator, which is peculiar
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of genetic algorithms. The Community Manager, which implements the Input
Manager interface, uses these generators and requires an Individual Selector.
The Individual Selector must implement a selection algorithm necessary to
choose individuals that will be used as parents for the next generation. The
Output Analyzer is implemented by an Individual Analyzer, which uses a
Fitness Evaluator to assign fitness values to individuals based on coverage
information.
3.3 Evolutionary Fuzzing Algorithm
The general evolutionary fuzzing approach of Chizpurfle is presented in Algo-
rithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Evolutionary fuzzing
Input: Service s, Condition stopCondition
1: instrumentProcess(s)
2: community = new Community(s)
3: for all population in community do
4: population.createRandomIndividuals()
5: population.offspring={}
6: end for
7: while not stopCondition do
8: for all individual in community do
9: executeTest(individual)
10: analyzeTest(individual)
11: saveTest(individual)
12: end for
13: community.updateFitnessValues()
14: community.updateTargetSizes()
15: for all population in community do
16: repeat
17: individual = population.selectOne()
18: if randomProbability() < crossoverRate then
19: ind2 = population.selectOne()
20: individual = crossOver(individual, ind2)
21: end if
22: if randomProbability() < mutationRate then
23: individual = mutate(individual)
24: end if
25: population.addOffSpring(individual)
26: until (population.OffSprings.size ==
population.targetSize)
27: population.individuals=population.offsprings
28: population.offsprings={}
29: end for
30: end while
In line 1, Chizpurfle looks for the Android OS process that hosts the service
under test, and instruments the process to gather runtime information during
the tests. Then, in line 2, it creates the community for the service under test,
by creating a population for each public method in the service interface.
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Lines 3∼6 initialize the populations with random individuals, as in generation-
based fuzzing tools. The number of individuals in each population is a param-
eter of the evolutionary algorithm, namely populationInitialTargetSize.
The individuals are randomly generated according to the type of the argu-
ments for the method. Alternatively, it is also possible to start from inputs
recorded during the normal execution of the device, or from existing test cases.
However, since we focus on proprietary Android OS services, we do not have
test cases from the vendor developers. Moreover, it is difficult, and still not
sufficient, to use initial inputs captured when running the services, since pro-
prietary customizations may be exercised by specific apps or UI events that
do not occur when running generic workloads for the Android OS.
Chizpurfle evolves the community until a stopCondition is met (line 7).
This stop condition can be a time condition (e.g., stop after 2 hours of testing),
a generation limit (e.g., stop after the 10th generation), or a specific objective
(e.g., stop after 3 failures).
The evolutionary loop starts by executing, analyzing, and saving the results
for every individual in the community (lines 8∼12). During the execution,
the Instrumentation Module of Chizpurfle saves a list of covered blocks and
branches, which are analyzed together with the Android logs and any exception
raised by the method call. This information is also saved on the device storage
for off-line analysis.
Line 13 computes the fitness function for each analyzed individual. The
fitness function is a heuristic that ranks individuals with respect to their
potential for generating (through mutation and cross-over) good new individ-
uals that can cover more code. We included in Chizpurfle the following three
fitness functions from previous fuzz testing studies, where the fitness value is
proportional to:
– The number of executed blocks (Fexecuted_blocks): the fittest individual is the
input that executed more blocks, as evolving an individual that exercises
long paths has the potential to trigger subtle bugs;
– The number of least executed blocks (Fleast_executed): the fittest individual
is the input that executed those blocks that have been executed the least
by the previous generations, in order to promote the exploration of new
paths (Böhme et al, 2016);
– The number of times the executed branches have been executed by other
individuals (Fleast_branch_hit_count): the fittest individual is the input that
executed those branches with the lowest branch hit count (Michal Zalewski,
2016); the hit count is tracked with logarithmic bins, as in the AFL fuzzing
tool (i.e., the number of inputs that executed the branch n times, with
2k ≤ n < 2k − 1).
Once every individual has a fitness value, Chizpurfle computes the new
target size for each population, i.e., how many individuals should the next it-
eration generate for the population (line 14). Our goal is to boost the testing of
promising methods and to avoid wasting time on trivial methods. To this goal,
we reward the population with a higher average fitness value, by increasing
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its size by 1, and by reducing by 1 the weakest population (with a minimum
of two individuals). Moreover, Chizpurfle includes a second mechanism that
modifies the target sizes, which serves to avoid populous communities to take a
very long time for an iteration. When the total number of individuals exceeds
the maxCommunitySize parameter by a certain amount (a surplus), Chizpur-
fle reduces the target size of the worst populations by half of the surplus to
make the total number of individuals converge at maxCommunitySize.
The next step is the generation of new individuals (i.e., offsprings), to
reach the target size of each population (lines 15∼29). For each offspring, an
individual is first selected (line 17). With a probability crossOverRate, the in-
dividual is mixed with a second one with a crossover operation (lines 18∼21).
Chizpurfle randomly applies one of these crossover operators:
– single-point : A single crossover point on both parents is chosen. The off-
spring takes the part before the point from the first parent, and merges it
with the part beyond the point of the second parent;
– two-points: Two points are chosen on the parents. The offspring takes the
inner part from the first parent, and the outer part from the second parent;
– uniform: the offspring randomly takes every single point from one parent
or the other.
Crossover operators are applied in a cascade mode. First, the operators
select a point among the parameters of the method, where every parameter
represents a point. Afterwards, the crossover operator focuses on the selected
parameter, by selecting a point inside the value of the parameter. In this
case, the nature of the point depends on the parameter type: For example,
for primitive types, we consider their binary representation, where every bit
represents a point; in the case of strings, every character represents a point;
and, for complex objects, every public field represents a point.
In a similar way, with a probability mutationRate, the offspring is mutated
(lines 22∼24). The fuzz operators include:
– Primitive types (boolean, byte, char, double, float, integer, long, short):
substitute with a random value, substitute with the additive identity (0),
substitute with the multiplicative identity (1), substitute with the maxi-
mum value, substitute with the minimum value, add a random delta, sub-
tract a random delta, substitute with a special character (only for char);
– Strings: substitute with a random string, substitute with a very long ran-
dom string, truncate the string, add random substring, remove random
substring, substitute a random character from the string with a special
character, substitute with the empty string, substitute with null;
– Arrays and Lists: substitute with an array of random length and items,
remove random items, add random items, apply fuzz operator on an item
value according to its type, substitute with an empty array, substitute with
null;
– Objects: substitute with null, invoke constructor with random parameters,
apply fuzz operator on a field value according to its type.
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For a given parameter type, one of the listed operators is randomly chosen
each time. For Object types, ad-hoc fuzzers exist for important specific classes
defined by the Android OS. For example, the android.content.Intent class has
a specific fuzzer that injects into the fields of an Intent (such as actions, cat-
egories, and extras) special values that have a meaning for the Intent (e.g.,
ACTION_MAIN and ACTION_CALL for the Intent actions) (AndroidXRef,
2017b); and the fuzzer for the android.content.ComponentName class takes
into account which components are installed on the target device, in order
to use and to mutate valid component names during fuzz testing. For all the
other classes, a generic object fuzzer uses the Java Reflection API to create
new objects using the class constructor with random parameters, and to in-
voke setter methods of the class to place random values in the fields of the
object.
Every time an individual is selected in the generation phase (lines 17 and
19), a selection algorithm is in charge of this choice. Chizpurfle implements
three algorithms:
– Sfitness_proportionate: individuals are chosen with a probability proportional
to their fitness value (inspired by Bäck et al. (Back, 1996));
– Sranking: individual are chosen according to its position in the rank of
individuals (inspired by Bäck et al. (Bäck and Hoffmeister, 1991));
– Stournament: a number tour of individuals is chosen randomly from the
population, and the best individual from this group is selected as a parent,
for each requested parent (inspired by Goldberg et al. (Goldberg and Deb,
1991)).
Finally, in lines 27∼28, the offsprings take the place of the individuals of
the previous generation, and are used for the next iteration of the algorithm.
4 Experimental analysis
This section presents experiments with the proposed Chizpurfle platform, ac-
cording to the research questions that were introduced in Section 2. We first
compare the evolutionary approach with the simpler black-box approach (Sub-
sections 4.1 and 4.2). Then, we evaluate the different options for the fitness
function and the selection algorithm (Subsection 4.3).
The tests were performed on three high-end Android smartphones, i.e., a
Huawei P8 (running Android 6), an LG Nexus 5X (running Android 7), and
a Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge (running Android 7). For each device, we use
the Chizpurfle Method Extractor to detect system services customized by the
vendor. The Chizpurfle Orchestrator ran on a MacBook Pro with 3GHz Intel
Core i7 processor and 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 memory. The other components
of Chizpurfle ran on the actual Android devices, in order to be able to test
their proprietary customizations.
Overall, the three devices expose 45 custom services in Huawei, 134 in Sam-
sung, and 10 in LG Nexus. The Chizpurfle platform leverages the Java Reflec-
tion API to get information about the methods and parameters of Android
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the tested Android system services
Service # Methods
# All parameters # Object parameters
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
H
U
A
W
E
I BastetService 28 2.54 1 8 0.71 0 5
hwAlarmService 2 4 3 5 1 1 1
hwConnectivityExService 2 1 1 1 0.5 0 1
hwUsbExService 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
nonhardaccelpkgs 4 1.25 1 2 1 1 1
L
G
N
E
X
U
S ethernet 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
ims 8 2 1 4 0.5 0 2
isms 20 4.45 1 8 2.3 0 6
phone 68 1.5 1.0 5 0.72 0 4
sip 6 2.5 2 4 2.5 2 4
SA
M
SU
N
G ABTPersistenceService 14 3.14 1 8 2.5 0 6
CocktailBarService 41 1.8 1 4 0.88 0 3
knoxcustom 142 1.41 1 5 0.45 0 4
spengestureservice 6 2 1 5 0.83 0 2
wifihs20 9 1.11 1 2 0.67 0 1
services. Therefore, we focus on the Android services that are implemented
in Java, which represent a large majority of services: 32 custom services in
Huawei, 114 in Samsung, 5 in LG Nexus. We performed tests on 5 Android
services per device (15 target services in total), in order to have a uniform
number of target services across the devices, and for the following two rea-
sons.
First, every fuzz testing campaign has a large computational cost, as it
consists of a large number of tests (where a test means to generate a set of
test input parameters, perform one method invocation using these parameter
inputs, gather coverage, and assess the occurrence of failures). In our context,
the computational bottleneck is represented by the Android device in which we
run the tests: this is an unavoidable limitation, since our approach is meant to
test proprietary services running on the actual Android device (e.g., we cannot
simply run the proprietary version of the Android OS on a device emulator
on a more powerful machine). Therefore, performing the analysis on all of the
151 proprietary Android services (i.e., ten times the services that we tested in
this paper) would incur in an unaffordable computational cost. Focusing on
a subset of services led to more than 8 millions of experiments in 65 days 4
hours 19 minutes (CPU time).
Second, we selected those services with a testing surface quite diverse from
each other, both in terms of number of methods, and in terms of type and
number of parameters to the methods. In order to get the right services, we
selected the set of services randomly, and then checked that the services com-
plied with our requirement of having diverse targets. After the tests, we found
that this diversity was able to point out both the best and the worst cases
for the proposed approach (e.g., cases with a tenfold increase of coverage,
and cases with a coverage equivalent to black-box fuzzing), and allowed us
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to discuss the strengths and the limitations of the proposed approach in this
section.
We report descriptive statistics for the complexity of the system services
in Table 1, including the number of the public methods of the service, the
number of arguments, and the number of objects (i.e., non-primitive types)
among the arguments. Some Android services tend to expose few methods, but
their input parameters can be complex objects. For example, the “spengesture”
service (also discussed in Subsection 4.2) can take in input an array of objects
representing UI events; and the “sip” service takes in input a SIP URI string
whose format is complex and prone to string parsing vulnerabilities. In other
cases, the services can expose tens, or even hundreds of methods (such as 142
methods in the case of “knoxcustom”). We consider a combination of services
with different amounts and complexity of methods, and we discuss how the
complexity of the services relates to evolutionary fuzzing.
It is important to note that the total number of basic blocks in each tar-
get service is not available to us, since the Android OS architecture does not
clearly separate the code of distinct services into distinct processes and binary
executables. Instead, in the Android OS architecture, the services (including
proprietary ones) run as threads within the same shared process. For example,
the Media Server process of the Android OS runs both the Camera Service
and the Audio Flinger services; the System Server runs a large number of priv-
ileged services (several tens of services in the AOSP (Stack Overflow, 2016;
Yaghmour, 2013)), such as the Activity Manager, the Package Manager, the
Power Manager, and many others. In addition to AOSP services, Android ven-
dors introduce their own proprietary services (and threads) to these processes.
Since the thread of the target service shares (and, in principle, can execute)
the whole code area of the process where they run with all other threads in
the process (i.e., the code of all services that were compiled into the binary
executable of the process), it is difficult to know which specific subset of the
code area belongs to a specific target service. This problem is exacerbated by
the lack of the source code for the proprietary services (i.e., we cannot simply
infer the code belonging to a service by looking at how the source code is
organized in different source code files/folders). For these reasons, we cannot
accurately know which are the basic blocks of code that can be potentially
reached by a target service. This is one of the reasons that makes proprietary
services difficult to fuzz, since it is difficult to detect whether the test coverage
is saturating the code of a target service.
We remark that even if we considered several devices from different vendors,
our purpose is not to compare them, but to evaluate the effectiveness of fuzzing
techniques in different contexts. Moreover, most of the proprietary services
are only available on specific devices and do not have equivalent counterparts
among the competitors.
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4.1 Test coverage achieved by evolutionary and black-box fuzzing
We first tested each service with the evolutionary approach under the simplest
configuration. We adopted the number of executed blocks (Fexecuted_block) as
fitness function, and the fitness proportionate reproduction (Sfitness_proportionate)
as selection algorithm. We tuned the Chizpurfle’s parameters (as shown in Ta-
ble 2) based on best practices and past experiences in the fields of fuzz testing
and genetic algorithms (cfr. Section 6).
Then, we tested the same services with black-box fuzzing, by configuring
the Chizpurfle platform to only use mutation operators (i.e., crossOverRate
drops to 0% and mutationRate becomes 100%) and to disable the coverage-
guided feedback loop. Therefore, individuals are randomly mutated, popula-
tions do not change in size, and no method is preferred over the others. Since
input generation is not driven by test coverage, we do not perform dynamic
binary instrumentation, and disable the Instrumentation Module. To perform
a fair comparison between the evolutionary and black-box approaches, we ran
black-box fuzzing for the same amount of time of evolutionary fuzzing. How-
ever, the black-box approach does not provide us coverage data for performing
a comparison. Therefore, after the execution of black-box fuzzing, we replayed
the same black-box tests for a second time, and used the dynamic binary in-
strumentation technique to collect coverage data for the black-box tests. In
this second run, we enabled the Instrumentation Module during black-box
fuzzing, even if this component is not applied for driving input generation. By
running the black-box tests respectively without and with instrumentation,
we can first generate the same amount of tests that would be produced by a
non-coverage-driven black-box approach, and then evaluate the coverage for
these tests in a separate phase.
Even if dynamic binary instrumentation introduces a slow-down on the
speed of test execution, the slow-down still allows the Android services to exe-
cute without any noticeable side effect, thus preserving the intended behavior
of the tests. On average, the slow-down of coverage profiling is 13.91x. To put
this number into context, we must consider that the performance slow-down is
inline with other tools for dynamic binary instrumentation. For example the
Valgrind framework (which also uses dynamic binary rewriting for complex
analyses, such as finding memory leaks and race conditions), when applied on
the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark (Nethercote and Seward, 2007), causes an av-
erage slow-down of 4.3x when the program is simply executed on the Valgrind
virtual machine; and an average slow-down of 22.1x when performing memory
leak analysis. Such overhead when running tests is rewarded by a higher bug-
finding power, and it is in many cases accepted by developers as shown by the
widespread adoption of Valgrind in automated regression test suites in open-
source projects (Cotroneo et al, 2013b). The comparison between black-box
and evolutionary fuzzing aims to to evaluate whether the slow-down induced
by coverage profiling is rewarded by a more thorough coverage.
We executed 10 repetitions of both the evolutionary and black-box fuzzing
campaigns in order to gain statistical confidence in the results, in a similar
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Table 2 Parameters for the genetic algorithm of Chizpurfle
Parameter Value
populationInitialTargetSize 10
stopCondition 20th generation
maxCommunitySize 200
crossOverRate 80%
mutationRate 5%
tour 5
way to previous studies in the field of random testing (Arcuri and Briand,
2014). We performed a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to analyze how
the choice between black-box and evolutionary fuzzing affects the coverage of
the service under test. We also used the service name as a block-factor, i.e., a
second factor, which forms a two-way analysis without interaction.
We consider the number of basic blocks as the dependent variable. The one-
way ANOVA tests the null hypothesis that there are no differences between
the mean values of two or more independent groups. If it returns a statistically
significant result, we reject the null hypothesis: there are at least two group
means that have a statistically-significant difference.
Since the normality assumptions are not met by the dataset, we adopted
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test with the two-sample normal approx-
imation (Mann and Whitney, 1947), instead of the conventional Fisher test
(Fisher, 1922). The p-value, related to the null hypothesis that there is no
difference between black-box and evolutionary approach, is less than 0.0001,
i.e., we can strongly reject the null hypothesis, and confirm that there is a
difference. The results of the one-way ANOVA are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3 One-way ANOVA for the evolutionary (EVO) and black-box (BB) approaches
groups EVO and BB
number of samples per group 150
mean of EVO group 159.4
std. deviation of EVO group 263.157
mean of BB group 53.147
std. deviation of BB group 133.89
Mann-Whitney p-value <0.0001
AˆEVO,BB 0.74
To quantify the strength of this result, we computed the effect size for
the Mann-Whitney test. We use the Vargha and Delaney’s Aˆ statistic, a
non-parametric effect size measure, to compute the common language effect
(Vargha and Delaney, 2000). The common language effect is a measure from
two groups, which represents the probability of confirming a hypothesis when
comparing a random pair of samples from the two groups. In our case, we con-
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sider the hypothesis that the evolutionary approach covers more code than the
black-box approach. The Vargha and Delaney’s statistic showed better results
for the evolutionary approach in 74% of the cases (AˆEV O,BB = 0.74). Thus,
in our experiments, in more than 7 times out of 10, the evolutionary approach
covers more code than the black-box approach in the service under test.
For all services, the evolutionary approach performed the same or better
than the simpler black-box approach. Table 4 shows the ratio between block
coverage of the genetic algorithm approach and black-box approach, by aver-
aging the results of the repetitions. This result confirms that the evolutionary
approach should be preferred over black-box, despite the slow-down caused by
coverage profiling. However, coverage profiling may not provide a significant
benefit for some services.
Table 4 Average code coverage gain from black-box to evolutionary fuzzing (EVO-to-BB
ratio)
Device Service Gain
HUAWEI
BastetService 1.43
hwAlarmService 2.29
hwConnectivityExService 2.43
hwUsbExService 1.14
nonhardaccelpkgs 1
LG
ethernet 1
ims 1
isms 1.97
phone 24.28
sip 1.14
SAMSUNG
ABTPersistenceService 1
CocktailBarService 1.01
knoxcustom 1
spengestureservice 2.14
wifihs20 2.6
The main observation is that the performance of the evolutionary approach
can be related to the complexity of the service under test. The services with
the lowest differences between black-box and evolutionary fuzzing are also the
ones with the lowest number of methods. However, the number of methods
seems not to be the only factor that is related to the highest gains from the
evolutionary approach. Indeed, the complexity of the methods’ signature, in
terms of number of arguments, seems to affect the results. For example, the
isms and phone services of the LG Nexus 5X have up to 8 and 5 arguments in
their methods, resulting in a high EVO/BB ratio (i.e., the ratio between the
code coverage of the evolutionary approach and of the black-box approach).
The hwAlarmService, whose methods have up to 5 arguments, exhibits a high
ratio despite the low number of methods.
The ABTPersistenceService of the Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge is the main
exception to this interpretation, since it has a large number of methods with
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up to 8 arguments, but a low EVO/BB ratio. We believe this is due to the high
mean in the number of objects among its arguments (i.e., 2.5), since this low
ratio may have been caused by the simplistic approach adopted by Chizpurfle
to fuzz non-standard objects; therefore, researching new, more complex fuzzing
operators represents another interesting research direction.
Finally, we should also consider the nature of the service. For example, the
Nexus Ethernet service is probably used to manage wired Ethernet connec-
tions, which is enabled only with a special adapter physically connected to the
device. Thus, most of this service code is hard to reach with both approaches,
resulting in an EVO/BB ratio equal to 1.
Table 5 Average code coverage gain from black-box to evolutionary fuzzing (EVO-to-BB
ratio), without the community mechanism
Device Service Gain (no community)
HUAWEI
BastetService 1.23
hwAlarmService 2.29
hwConnectivityExService 2.43
hwUsbExService 1.14
nonhardaccelpkgs 1
LG
ethernet 1
ims 1
isms 1.01
phone 12.97
sip 1
SAMSUNG
ABTPersistenceService 1
CocktailBarService 1.01
knoxcustom 1
spengestureservice 1.82
wifihs20 2.13
To further analyze the impact of the idea of community to co-evolve test
inputs, we performed additional tests for comparing black-box and evolution-
ary fuzzing. In these tests, we used the same configuration of the previous
round of experiments, but we disabled the community mechanism. Therefore,
the size of the populations of test inputs has been equal across all methods,
and fixed throughout the duration of the fuzz testing campaigns.
We report in Table 5 the gain in coverage between black-box and evolution-
ary fuzzing without the community mechanism. For some services, the gain
was the same of the case of evolutionary fuzzing with the community mecha-
nism (i.e., the services exhibit the same gains in Table 4 and 5), whereas for
other services there was a reduction of the gain due to the lack of the commu-
nity mechanism (i.e., the gain in Table 5 was lower than Table 4). We remark
that the community mechanism brings an improvement (up to doubling the
coverage gain for the phone service) for the services that expose a large number
of methods (as reported in Table 1). These larger services have more methods
whose coverage is quickly saturated, thus giving to the community mechanism
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Fig. 4 Evolution of population size in the community for the spengesture service.
more opportunities to reduce the population of such methods in favor of more
promising ones. Fig. 4 shows an example of evolution of the population sizes
for one of the services under test (spengesture), where the population size of
many methods is reduced in favor of the injectInputEvent method.
4.2 Robustness bugs found by evolutionary fuzzing
During evolutionary fuzzing, the Chizpurfle platform incurred in critical fail-
ures of privileged OS services, thus with a strong impact on the reliability of
the Android device. Moreover, these failures can be potentially leveraged to
get confidential information and to subvert key Android processes; therefore,
they have a high value for malicious attackers. These failures were triggered by
complex combinations of inputs, which were generated after few generations of
fuzzing tests. We note that the community mechanism was unable to further
increase the time to find these vulnerabilities, since it takes some generations
to gradually develop during the fuzz campaign (e.g., in Fig. 4, the population
sizes varies over a period of more than 10 generations).
To analyze the failures, we first ensured that the failures were reproducible,
by re-issuing the inputs that triggered the failures during fuzzing, and check-
ing that the failures occur again. Then, we analyzed the input surface of the
vulnerable target service, and the failure messages that the service reported on
the logs, which included uncaught exceptions and the stack trace at the time
of the failure. Despite the source code was not available to us, this information
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allowed us to understand the root cause of the failures, and trace the failures
back to 2 distinct bugs.
The first bug showed up while testing the spengestureservice service of the
Samsung device, hosted by the system_server process. The individuals that
made the tests fail belong to the injectInputEvent method population. Even
if we cannot access to the source code of this method, we found a similar
method (with the same name and minor differences in the method signature)
provided by the InputManager class of AOSP, which handles input devices
such as keyboards. This method “injects an input event into the event system
on behalf of an application” (AndroidXRef, 2017a). It is likely that the method
with the same name in the spengestureservice performs the same operation for
input events from the “S Pen” in Samsung devices (Samsung, 2017b). The
method gets as parameter, among others, an array of android.view.InputEvent
objects, which is an abstract class for representing input events from hardware
components. Chizpurfle detected a FATAL EXCEPTION when this array is
non-null and non-empty, and at least one of its elements is null (instead, the
service does not fail if the array is simply null or empty). This input causes
the service to throw a NullPointerException that is not caught, causing a
crash. Depending on which process consumes the injected events, the bug can
manifest as either a crash of the com.android.systemui process with a black
screen of the user interface for a few seconds; or a crash of the system_server
process with the restart of the whole Android device.
The second bug belongs to the callInVoIP method from the voip ser-
vice of the Samsung device. Very likely, this method is used by the VoIP
app for corporate users from Samsung (Samsung, 2017a). The test input
is a SIP address URI, represented as a long, structured string (e.g., “sip:1-
999-123-4567@voip-provider.example.net”). If SQL control expressions are in-
jected in this string (e.g., single quotes as in SQL injection), the string trig-
gers an SQLLiteException that is not caught by the host process, namely
com.samsung.android.incallui. This is a customization introduced by Samsung
to the AOSP com.android.incallui, which provides an UI handler for the ac-
tivity that appears during a call, and that provides on-screen functions for han-
dling a VoIP call. Since the exception is not caught, the com.samsung.android.incallui
process crashes and cuts off any ongoing call. Moreover, the bug could be po-
tentially used maliciously to steal private data of the VoIP service (e.g., the
list of contacts) from an unprivileged application. It is important to note that
this bug could not be easily triggered with random string corruption, since the
injected expressions should at specific places of the SIP address URI. While
black-box fuzzing was not able to find this bug, evolutionary fuzzing was able
to tune the test input generation to find the vulnerable part of the URI string.
4.3 Comparison among evolutionary configurations
We tested again the same system services, to determine whether there is a
configuration in the evolutionary approach that performs better than the oth-
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Table 6 Number of covered basic blocks, with respect to different fitness functions
Mean Std. dev.
Fexecuted_blocks 51.4889 32.6536
Fleast_executed 47.8889 17.939
Fleast_branch_hit_count 46.0889 23.2348
Table 7 Number of covered basic blocks, with respect to different selection algorithms
Mean Std. dev.
Sfitness_proportionate 52.9778 32.61
Sranking 52.3111 23.0925
Stournament 40.1778 15.5087
Table 8 Pairwise analysis of selection algorithms
Selection alg. 1 Selection alg. 2 Mann-Whitney p-value Aˆalg.1,alg.2
Sfitness_proportionate Sranking 0.9742 0.498
Sfitness_proportionate Stournament 0.0011 0.7
Sranking Stournament 0.004 0.681
ers. We considered every combination of the 3 fitness functions and of the 3
selection algorithms, and applied these combinations on each of the 15 sys-
tem services, for a total of 135 evolutionary fuzzing campaigns. Table 6 and
Table 7 show the number of basic blocks covered by Chizpurfle and grouped
by, respectively, the fitness functions and the selection algorithms, counting 45
samples in each group.
We consider the null hypotheses that the choices of the fitness function and
of the selection algorithm have no effect on the coverage achieved evolutionary
testing, and we performed the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test (Kruskal
and Wallis, 1952) since data are not normally distributed2. We once again
used the service name as a block-factor. The p-values, computed by the Chi-
Square approximation (Mann and Whitney, 1947), are 0.9693 for the fitness
function factor and 0.0037 for the selection algorithm factor.
The selection algorithm factor has a very low p-value: the choice of a selec-
tion algorithm has a statistically significant effect. However, while the ANOVA
test confirms that at least two groups have a statistically-significant difference,
it does not point out which specific group is the best one. To detect the best
selection algorithm for evolutionary fuzzing, we performed pairwise tests and
measure effect size in each case. The results are in Table 8. While the fitness
proportionate reproduction (Sfitness_proportionate) and ranking (Sranking) se-
lection algorithms are equivalent in terms of coverage, they both perform bet-
ter than the tournament selection algorithm (Stournament).
2 Kruskal-Wallis test extends the Mann–Whitney test for more than two groups.
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Fig. 5 ANOVA visualization for the fitness function factor
Fig. 6 ANOVA visualization for the selection algorithm factor
The Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the ANOVA data and results. A means dia-
mond represents the group mean (the line across each diamond) and the 95%
confidence interval (the vertical span of each diamond). Each diamond has also
two marks above and below the group mean. For groups with equal sample
sizes, as in our cases, overlapping marks indicate that the two group means are
not significantly different at the 95% confidence level. Thus, we can visually
confirm that with respect to the selection algorithm factor, we must reject
the null hypothesis because the tournament selection algorithm (Stournament)
diamond is right below the other two as shown in Fig. 6.
If we consider the combination of the fitness function and the selection
algorithm as a unique factor, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test returns
a very low p-value of 0.0011: the Fitness Function/Selection Algorithm combi-
nation groups have a statistically significant difference. Thus, we can compute
the best configuration, using the approach proposed by Fraser et al. based on
configuration rank (Fraser and Arcuri, 2011b). With a total of 9 configura-
tions, we compare each configuration with the other 8. For each comparison
in which a configuration is statistically better, its score is increased by one.
Otherwise, if a configuration is statistically worse, its score is decreased by
one. Considering an initial score of 0, the higher score a configuration has,
the better it is in terms of coverage. The score rank is presented in Table 9.
The best combination is to use a fitness function proportional to the num-
ber of times the executed branches have been executed by other individuals
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Table 9 Ranking of fuzzing configurations
Rank Fitness function Selection algorithm Score Mean Std. dev.
1 Fleast_branch_hit_count Sranking 6 58 31.1069
2 Fexecuted_blocks Sfitness_proportionate 5 69.6 49.4919
3 Fleast_executed Sfitness_proportionate 3 49 12.655
4 Fleast_executed Sranking 0 54.4667 22.0389
5 Fleast_branch_hit_count Sfitness_proportionate -2 40.3333 15.7567
Fexecuted_blocks Sranking -2 44.4667 10.8181
7 Fexecuted_blocks Stournament -3 40.4 15.7671
Fleast_branch_hit_count Stournament -3 39.9333 15.896
9 Fleast_executed Stournament -4 40.2 15.9535
(Fleast_branch_hit_count) with the ranking selection algorithm (Sranking). The
worst combinations are, as expected, those with the tournament selection al-
gorithm (Stournament), that should be avoided.
Considering the nature of the selection algorithms, we must highlight that
the tournament selection algorithm (Stournament) is the only one of the three
with a tunable parameter. This algorithm selects tour individuals (5, cfr. Ta-
ble 2) randomly from the population and returns the fittest of this group.
The bound to this parameter limits the potentiality of this selection algorithm
in a scenario such our one, where the populations change in size during the
campaign. This consideration strengthens the statistical results, suggesting
that nonparametric selection algorithms should be preferred for evolutionary
fuzzing.
5 Threats to Validity
5.1 Internal Validity
This study shows that evolutionary fuzzing can test Android OS system ser-
vices more thoroughly (e.g., in terms of code coverage) compared to black-box
fuzzing. Furthermore, we analyzed the impact of the choice of fitness function
and selection algorithm. However, we considered only three fitness functions
and three selection algorithms implemented in Chizpurfle. There are several
potential tunings among the parameters of an evolutionary algorithm but we
focused on these two, and we chose only three options for each of them. We
chose them among the most popular and intuitive ones (Böhme et al, 2016;
Michal Zalewski, 2016; Back, 1996; Bäck and Hoffmeister, 1991; Goldberg and
Deb, 1991), but there exist other options we did not consider. Other tunings
can further improve the coverage that, with our results, seems to be already
better than the simple black-box approach. The design of Chizpurfle is highly
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extensible, so that new fitness functions and selection algorithms can be easily
added and used for further experimentations.
Another threat to validity is potentially represented by the initial (random)
seeds that we used for the experimentation. In principle, starting from a sample
of valid seeds (i.e., input vectors that adhere to the validity constraints for
the methods) can further improve the code coverage for both the black-box
and grey-box approaches. Unfortunately, crafting input vectors for proprietary
Android services (e.g., by collecting inputs from real executions under some
user interactions with apps) would be problematic, and the inputs would not
necessarily be of better quality than random ones. One reason is that we do
not have any official documentation for proprietary services; for some of them,
such as the bastet in Huawei, we could not even find any public information
about the role of the service. Therefore, we cannot know which apps exercise
the service and under which conditions. We would still rely on a trial-and-
error approach to define an initial set of seeds, and we would likely not be
able to cover all of the several methods of the services (e.g., 28 methods in
the case of bastet). Moreover, using manually-crafted seeds would still present
methodological issues, since we would have a bias due to our specific choice of
the workload, and would make the study less reproducible. Therefore, we opted
for using initial random seeds. Chizpurfle takes into account the data type of
input parameters, in order to generate inputs that are always compliant to the
signature of the methods. For all the services that we tested, this sufficed to
always have many valid, structured inputs (e.g., inputs that were processed by
the services without raising any exception) within the few initial generations of
fuzzing (with both the black-box and gray-box approaches). The evolutionary
approach further improves over the initial seeds, such that to overcome the
initial checks performed by input parsers and to explore the target service in
depth. Exploring more seed generation strategies is a potential direction for
future research based on our fuzzing platform.
5.2 External Validity
This study focuses on three different Android devices, but it can be easily
replicated on other Android devices. In this study, we randomly chose 5 services
as target for each of the device. They represent only a fraction of all the services
and can be subject to bias. Nevertheless, they are very heterogeneous services
in terms of number of methods and type of arguments, as presented in Table 1.
Furthermore, the open-source nature of the tool should help other researchers
and practitioners to perform new study and test campaigns on any Android
device, even with other evolutionary approaches we did not consider.
6 Related work
This section gives an overview of the state-of-the-art in the broad area of
fuzzing, with a focus on evolutionary approaches and on the Android OS.
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Fuzzing became popular in testing system software due to its ease-of-use
and its applicability on libraries, network services, command-line applications,
and OS kernel interfaces. A first study by Miller et al (1990) tested the UNIX
system utilities by injecting random inputs to their interfaces, and it found
an unexpected number of crashes, leaks, and deadlocks even when the inputs
look trivial. Other researchers extended this idea by creating new OS robust-
ness testing approaches, such as BALLISTA (Koopman and DeVale, 2000),
MAFALDA (Fabre et al, 1999), the DBench project (Kanoun et al, 2005), and
SABRINE (Cotroneo et al, 2013a).
More recently, fuzzing has been enhanced with white-box solutions, such
as by leveraging symbolic execution. KLEE (Cadar et al, 2008) and SAGE
(Godefroid et al, 2008) are the most famous ones. KLEE is based on a virtual
machine environment, which forks every time it meets a condition, exploring
both paths of every branch. SAGE uses a record&replay framework (Bhansali
et al, 2006) to negate one of the logical conditions across a (concrete) path,
and generates new inputs to explore different paths. These solutions use a
constraint solver to find a concrete input to fulfill all of the conditions on a
path. Thus, these technologies are very resource- and time-consuming.
Gray-box fuzzing is another, more lightweight approach, based on the idea
of exploiting execution data to guide the generation/mutation of fuzz inputs.
This category of fuzzers adopts techniques from the research area of search-
based software engineering (Harman et al, 2012): hill climbing, simulated an-
nealing, and genetic algorithms are search-based approaches that were also
used for fuzzing. AFL (Michal Zalewski, 2016) is the most widespread fuzzing
tool of this kind, which has been defined by its authors as an “instrumentation-
guided genetic fuzzer”. It exploits basic evolutionary techniques to efficiently
improve the quality of fuzz inputs based on coverage measurements. By mutat-
ing previous inputs, AFL tries to discover new paths. Improvements of AFL
has been presented in subsequent work: AFLFast (Böhme et al, 2016) and
AFLGo (Böhme et al, 2017). The first exploits a Markov chain model, which
specifies the probability that fuzzing an input that exercises path i generates
an input that exercises path j. The second is a directed fuzzing solution, i.e.,
it generates inputs with the objective of reaching a given set of target program
locations efficiently.
With a different objective, SlowFuzz (Petsios et al, 2017) is a framework
that automatically finds inputs that trigger worst-case algorithmic behavior
in the tested binary. It exploits evolutionary search techniques together with
dynamic analysis. Initially, SlowFuzz randomly selects an input to execute from
a given seed corpus, which is mutated and passed as input to the program under
test. During an execution, it records profiling information, such as the total
count of all instructions executed. An input is scored based on its resource
usage, and it is added to the mutation corpus if the input is deemed as a slow
unit.
Exploring the intersection between testing and evolutionary approaches,
Rawat et al (2017) presented the VUzzer application-aware evolutionary fuzzing
strategy. VUzzer combines static analysis with mutation-based evolutionary
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techniques to efficiently generate inputs. It exploits dynamic taint analysis,
magic-byte detection, basic block weight calculation, and error-handling code
detection. Instead, Veggalam et al (2016) proposed IFuzzer. It exploits an evo-
lutionary fuzzing technique and targets JavaScript interpreters. IFuzzer uses
the language grammar to generate valid inputs and generates new code frag-
ments by performing genetic operations on a test suite.
Among evolutionary approaches, it is important to mention EvoSuite (Fraser,
2017; Fraser and Arcuri, 2011a), which is an automatic test suite generator
with assertions for classes written in Java code. It exploits evolutionary al-
gorithms for the generation of a whole test suite, optimizing to a coverage
criterion rather than individual coverage goals. A candidate solution in Evo-
Suite is a test suite, consisting of a variable number of individual test cases.
Each of the test cases is a sequence of method calls, exercising the unit under
test and setting up complex objects in order to do so. EvoMaster (Arcuri,
2018) is its spin-off: a RESTful API automated test case generator that finds
faults using the HTTP return statuses as an automated oracle.
In the general research field of fuzzing, black-/gray-/white-box fuzzing
techniques are all means for generating streams of unusual inputs in order
to find robustness issues, with different cost-efficiency trade-offs. On one ex-
treme, black-box fuzzing is a “cheap” approach to input generation, by using
randomness, grammars, or lists of known problematic inputs; it tends to be
the least effective approach, but it is also the easiest one to deploy (e.g., it can
be applied in the earlier stages of testing) and can achieve a decent trade-off
between testing efforts and bugs found (as it is lightweight and can generate
a high number of inputs). On the other extreme, white-box fuzzing gener-
ates inputs by applying advanced program analysis techniques (for example,
constraint solving), which is the most computationally-heavyweight approach
and is the most complex approach to deploy, but it is able to find the most
subtle bugs. Gray-box fuzzing (which includes evolutionary fuzzing) is in the
middle of this design spectrum, as it steers the generation of inputs by leverag-
ing feedback from the coverage of previous inputs, and it is moderately more
complex to deploy than black-box fuzzing, but it is more lightweight than
white-box fuzzing. As an example of complementary use of these techniques,
a study from Microsoft researchers (Bounimova et al, 2013) reports a split of
66%-33% of bugs found respectively by black- and white-box fuzzing during
the development of Microsoft’s Windows 7. It is also important to clarify that
“black-box fuzzing” and “evolutionary fuzzing” should be considered a com-
plement, rather than a replacement, to black-box testing and other forms of
testing. In black-box testing (such as, partition-based testing), the inputs are
generated by leveraging a-priori knowledge about the partitioning of the input
space, the functional features, and the user requirements. Fuzzing approaches,
including ours, typically do not rely on such a-priori domain knowledge.
In Android-related research, fuzzing has been extensively used to attack
network and inter-process interfaces. For example, Mulliner and Miller (2009)
found severe vulnerabilities in the SMS protocol. Droidfuzzer (Ye et al, 2013)
targets Android activities that accept MIME data through Intents (a higher-
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level IPC mechanism based on Binder); Sasnauskas and Regehr (2014) devel-
oped a more generic Intent fuzzer that can mutate arbitrary fields of Intent
objects. Mahmood et al (2012) adopted the white-box fuzzing approach by
decompiling Android apps to identify interesting inputs, and running them
on Android emulator instances on the cloud. However, these tools and similar
ones (Maji et al, 2012; Au et al, 2012; Yang et al, 2014; Hu and Neamtiu, 2016;
Cao et al, 2015; Feng and Shin, 2016) are mostly black-box and focus on the
robustness of Android apps, which expose a different attack surface than An-
droid system services. For example, Intents are data containers that follow a
specific format, which includes an action identifier, a resource URI, and other
optional fields; instead, Android system services use the Binder IPC, which
is a richer, RPC-oriented IPC mechanism, which cannot be fuzzed through
intents.
Our evolutionary fuzzing approach differs from the state-of-the-art in sev-
eral ways. First, it is implemented on top of Chizpurfle (Iannillo et al, 2017)
and, thus, it is the first gray-box, evolutionary fuzzing approach specifically
tailored for vendor customizations in the Android OS, and overcoming the
limitations of this context (e.g., inability to recompile the source code, and
to run the services outside the device). Our approach does not target tradi-
tional fuzzing targets, such as multimedia file parsers and small command-line
programs, but aims to test Android services with an API-oriented interface.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, it is the only approach that introduces
the concept of community, enabling the co-evolution of populations with indi-
viduals physically located in the same target but impossible to combine due
to syntactic constraints.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented a novel evolutionary fuzzing approach, specifically tai-
lored for Android OS and its closed-source customizations by Android vendors.
We developed a tool, Chizpurfle, to provide a general platform for evolution-
ary fuzzing. The main feature of Chizpurfle is its ability to work directly on
the commercial device and its compiled code. Moreover, we tested 15 system
services from 3 commercial Android devices to evaluate the effectiveness of
evolutionary fuzzing and the impact of its configuration. Our evolutionary
fuzzing solution opens new possibilities for applying and experimenting with
new testing strategies.
As for the first research question (RQ1), evolutionary fuzzing always per-
forms no worse (in terms of code coverage) than black-box fuzzing, and in
most cases, evolutionary fuzzing brings a noticeable increase. Furthermore, we
observed that the performance of evolutionary fuzzing seems related to the
complexity of the service under test. The services with a richer API (in terms
of number of both methods and arguments) are the ones that benefit the most
from the evolutionary approach.
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To address the second research question (RQ2), we evaluated typical choices
for the fitness function and for the selection algorithm. Our analysis found that
there is no statistically significant difference between the fitness functions, but
we noted that choosing the tournament selection algorithm noticeably reduces
the performance of evolutionary fuzzing. We believe that the parametric na-
ture of this algorithm is not suitable for evolutionary fuzzing, where the size
of the populations needs to change over the test generations.
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